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Truth and Falsehood of the Mirror: 
Subjectivity – Reflection – Practice
Abstract
The author discusses different uses of the mirror metaphor in philosophy, 
literature and aesthetics. On one hand, a mirror serves to talk about human 
empowerment and inner life, while on the other becoming one of the most 
important metaphors of truth, of proper representation of reality. The final 
part of the paper considers the practical location of mirrors – and the practice 
of mirroring as the basis for other philosophical and existential metaphors. 
The author treats the mirror not only as a metaphor but also as an artefact 
with its own history: the history of an object but also social and economic 
history. By taking into account this physical history of mirrors, we can observe 
the changing foundation of epistemological and aesthetic metaphors.
Keywords: mirrors in culture, dialectics, metaphorology 
Mirror, reflection, mirroring. Both the process of reflection 
and the artefact itself create an imaginational resource of countless 
philosophical models of truth and falsehood. A mirror-reflected 
image suggests it is possible to produce a faithful representation 
of reality, but also – almost at the same time – that this image 
can be inaccurate, distorted, blurred, too dark or too bright. 
Thus the mirror defines the purpose of cognition as well as 
simultaneously indicating the possibility of different obstacles 
to achieving that purpose.
Of course a mirror is not the only metaphor of truth and 
falsehood; another equally important example would be the image 
of light and darkness, organized around the metaphor of, for 
instance, a lamp, which is the mirror’s great rival in both science 
and the arts (see Abrams, 2003). Quoting these two examples 
enables us to notice the real, physical basis of both metaphors, 
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which changed their meaning with the development of technology 
– with the improvement and popularization of artificial reflec-
tions as well as artificial light sources (Schivelbusch, 2004). If we 
also remember that both these technologies are often combined, 
for instance in mirror rooms where mirrors multiply the light by 
dispersing it, it will turn out that the two metaphors do not have 
to constitute alternatives and rivals at all, but are open to mutual 
translation. Indeed, light is a prerequisite for a mirror-reflected 
image, while mirrors themselves also contribute to brightening 
up various rooms by helping light disperse.
The present paper will discuss three fundamental meanings 
of the mirror in different discourses. The first two refer mainly 
to cognition and experience, to learning and aesthetics. A stable 
mirror standing in one place has become one of the main met-
aphors through which we speak of human subjectivity, and also 
of learning about the world. The experience of seeing our own 
mirror image is one of the pivotal moments in the development 
of human subjectivity – while the story of Narcissus gazing at 
his reflection has been an influence all the way to 20th-century 
theories of primary and secondary narcissism characterizing the 
constitution of individual consciousness, and in the theory of 
collective narcissism describing how a collective subject views 
itself in the mirror. Thus, the mirror is an artefact producing 
and disseminating different techniques of reflection – not only 
of the self but also social entities, networks, which reproduce 
themselves through a series of reflections. Therefore, the first 
part of the paper will discuss different subjective mirrors.
Part two will present different forms of mirroring – above all 
in art and philosophy. Mirroring is one of the most important 
aesthetic models: According to many theorists, art always reflects 
a reality, while others believe art should also mirror reality, because 
otherwise it does not fulfill its task. Thus, mirroring defines 
models of descriptive as well as normative aesthetics. A similar 
duality can be identified in metaphysical thinking about human 
cognition: Reflecting on the human mind leads fluidly to seeking 
adequate ways of mirroring the world. The mirror metaphor, 
therefore, stretches between the obvious situation of a direct 
reflection in a mirror and the realization that this reflection is 
not simple and obvious at all, as it encounters many possibili-
ties of distortion, falsification, resulting in a reflection that is 
inaccurate, untrue, that has to be amended, corrected, changed.
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The first two sections will focus on the subjective, theoreti-
cal and aesthetic meaning of the mirror. The model here will be 
mainly mirrors situated in one place, stable mirrors as well as 
small mirrors in which we see our own face – look at ourselves. In 
part three of the paper, I would like to analyze the less intuitive 
although also important and widespread meaning of the mirror, 
i.e. its practical application. Mirrors in everyday use are not only 
for looking at ourselves in detail; they also expand the human 
field of vision. They enable us to see what is behind us, to see 
things we cannot see when we are looking forward. Examples 
of such practical mirrors include car mirrors enabling drivers 
to see vehicles behind them. Thus, these are mirrors providing 
knowledge on changing reality, and at the same time causing the 
multiplication of different reflections in reality.
In all the sections of the present paper, the mirror and the 
reflection process are considered in a dual sense. At the forefront 
are metaphors – but we must not forget that those metaphors have 
a physical foundation that also underwent change. The metapho-
rological history of the mirror is the history of both the idea and 
the artefact. New possibilities of reflection, increasingly accurate 
and greater, move the process of mirroring away from its natural, 
fluid character toward fixing the image. This history of the tech-
nology of reflection is a social and economic history as well: It is 
also the history of the price of mirrors, monopolies tied to their 
manufacturing, the history of tradesmen who knew the secrets of 
making them, and, finally, the history of the democratization of 
mirrors, when everyone can view their own image at any time.
This complicated, network-like history of metaphors pro-
ceeds toward treating them much more broadly than in various 
linguistic and cognitive approaches. It is precisely examples like 
the mirror (and also light) that suggest we are dealing with more 
than metaphors, even than absolute metaphors to which Hans 
Blumenberg ascribed the special role of representing the entirety 
of philosophical ideas like the idea of the world or God, his-
tory, and humans in relation to them (Blumenberg, 2013, 2014). 
Those metaphors and artefacts serve as mediators taking part 
in negotiating different ways of understanding reality. Thus, 
these kinds of objects are not just metaphors serving to build 
utterances, but they also have the function of a technology for 
representing reality. They enable us to reduce complex reality 
by creating nodal points in the knowledge network. 
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1. The mirror: histories of subjectivity
In his Dzieje zwierciadła [The History of the Mirror] Mieczy-
sław Wallis notes that “the invention of the mirror dates back to 
times immemorial, it preceded the invention of writing” (Wallis, 
1974, p. 11). However, the mirror is an invention while also being 
something natural: Before the first polished metals and stones 
in which you could see your reflection appeared, people could 
see mirror images in water. The mirror as an artefact immedi-
ately puts humans in competition with nature, in a contest for 
creating a better, more accurate and more lasting mirroring of 
reality, particularly humans themselves. This suspension between 
nature on one hand and technology and artificiality on the other 
makes the mirror similar to another phenomenon that is both 
technical and natural, i.e. fire. Insofar as fire has the myth of 
its theft, a myth that became the foundation of many emanci-
pative historiosophies, the mirror seems not to have played such 
a significant role. The Narcissus myth refers us more to what 
is private and intimate, while mirrors themselves – despite their 
important social role – have interfered more strongly with the 
individual sphere.
In the historiosophy of modernity as well, fire seems to play 
a more important role: It was a new way of controlling fire that 
launched the industrial revolution, while the burning of coal 
(among other things) enabled Europe to gain an advantage over 
the rest of the world in the 19th century and build a hegem-
ony lasting many years. In this Promethean model, it is easy to 
forget the mirror. Nevertheless, starting from the 17th century 
we can find someone in practically every period who claimed it 
was the Baroque, the Enlightenment, or the 19th century that 
constituted the age of the mirror. This apparent discrepancy 
stems from the democratization of the mirror, which progressed 
with the process of modernity. Back in the 17th century, dur-
ing the Venetian monopoly on mirror manufacturing, mirrors 
were extremely rare and precious goods, accessible mainly to 
the aristocracy (Melchior-Bonnet, 2007). It was not until new 
production technologies were developed that mirrors could be 
made in greater numbers, placed in large spaces, and their price 
could go down. Thanks to these complicated processes, mirrors 
passed from courtly society, where they had enabled people to 
train their person in proper presentation among high society, 
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to the world of burgher intimacy. Whereas the Promethean myth 
was responsible for a comprehensive story about the progress 
of civilization, the mirror became a medium for shaping mod-
ern subjectivity which, through different reflections, has had to 
undergo continuous self-observation to this very day.
Already the story of Narcissus found in Metamorphoses pre-
sents a situation of looking at the water reflection of one’s own 
face – recognizing oneself, one’s face, opens the way to thinking 
about identity, self-knowledge as well as different affects that 
a subject can direct toward himself or herself. Thus, a mirror 
also becomes the start of self-reflection – let us note, however, 
that the source of this self-reflection is not in the subject, in 
some supposed inner life, but in a complicated relationship with 
objects, with surfaces capable of producing reflections. The Nar-
cissus myth involves a dual process: In the foreground we have 
the protagonist’s mirror duplication. Therefore, the mirror cre-
ates a strange relationship: not with others – with oneself, but 
as a duplicated being, seen in reflection, and at the same time 
felt from the inside. It needs remembering, though, that to see 
himself, Narcissus had to isolate himself from the group. This 
entangles us in the complicated dialectic of individualization 
and duplication, a dialectic in which the subject abandons rela-
tionships with others in order to meet the Other as his or her 
own reflection.
The individual mirror mechanism has been processed in dif-
ferent ways in psychological concepts: in Sigmund Freud’s notion 
of narcissism, Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage, and in recent decades 
in the metaphor of mirror neurons (Keysers, 2017). All these the-
ories assume we process our relationship with ourselves through 
external reflections; they make a shift in the strict separation 
between the individual and everything outside, especially other 
subjects, and also animals. Passing the mirror test was supposed 
to be one of the more important stages in becoming human. 
Similarly, the concept of mirror neurons locates the uniqueness 
of humans in their capacity for empathy and the development of 
special social competence enabling them to form numerous and 
complex groups capable of knowledge transfer and cooperation 
(Tomasello, 2017).
The theory of narcissism corresponded to different models of 
individualism and individuality. A broader version of this approach 
could be seen in the theory of collective narcissism outlined 
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by Erich Fromm in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. 
In group narcissism, the object of adoration is the community 
looking at itself in various symbolic images of itself; this collec-
tive fascination with one’s group identity results in fanaticism, 
manifesting itself especially strongly in sensitivity to collective 
symbols. They are precisely the mirrors in which the community 
wants to see itself. Any violation or criticism of such symbols is 
perceived as an attack on the identity of the group constituted 
around those images.
The mirror image of the subject proceeded toward becoming 
more permanent. From a reflection in water, whose surface is 
the easiest to disturb, we moved on to artificial mirrors which, 
however, did not present an accurate image for quite a long 
time, so it was no wonder that the mirror became one of the 
most important symbols of inaccurate cognition, contrasted with 
directly looking at one another face to face. Photography seems 
to be the most important way of fixing a mirror image, and in 
its successive versions it enabled images to be captured more and 
more accurately and quickly. Obviously, digital forms of such 
stabilization of mirrored subjectivity include selfies, as images 
that you can see and capture in an instant and then disseminate 
effortlessly. In this case, we manage to eliminate the difference 
between a mirror reflection, always fleeting and transitory, and 
an image, which usually involves a temporal delay and other 
forms of indirectness. This model also defines new boundaries 
of mirror self-control accomplished thanks to the possibility of 
continually looking at oneself in captured images. An image of 
oneself, which is often modified and improved, becomes a tem-
plate the subject tries to fit into.
Different meanings of the subjective mirror are analyzed by 
Heinrich Kleist in his essay On the Marionette Theater. This 
short text is based on the difference between a conscious being 
and a puppet or marionette, as it is structures of the human 
body deprived of consciousness that supposedly have the great-
est charm. In the narrator’s conversations with the mysterious 
Herr C., there appear three examples of confrontation between 
a conscious being and non-conscious bodies: the first one is the 
marionettes from the puppet theater, the second example is that 
of a statue that a graceful young man tries to imitate, while the 
third concerns an incredible swordfight with a master-swordsman 
bear. Example number two features a mirror, so let me quote it:
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…we had just recently seen the statue in Paris of the youth removing 
a thorn from his foot; the statue is well-known and models of it can 
be found in most German collections. A look cast into a large mirror, 
at the moment when he was placing his foot on a stool to dry it, 
reminded him of the statue; he smiled and told me of the discovery 
he had made. In fact, I had, just at that very moment, made the same 
discovery; however, whether it were to test the sureness of the grace 
that possessed him, or whether it were to cure him a little of his 
vanity, I laughed and replied that he was probably seeing ghosts. He 
started to blush and raised his foot a second time to convince me; 
but the attempt, as could easily have been foreseen, was unsuccessful. 
He raised his foot in confusion a third and a fourth time, he raised 
it probably another ten times: all to no avail! He was incapable of 
repeating the same movement. What am I saying? The movements 
he made had such a comical element to them that I had difficulty 
keeping from bursting out laughing.
From that time, from that very moment on, an indescribable change 
came over the young man. He started to spend his days standing 
in front of the mirror; and as he did so one attractive feature after 
another deserted him. An invisible and unaccountable power seemed, 
like an iron net, to lay itself over his gestures and facial expressions, 
and after a year had passed, there was no trace left to find in him of 
the loveliness that the eyes of the people, who otherwise surrounded 
him, had delighted in1 (Kleist, 2000).
The equal participants in this quite complex scene are two 
young men and two objects: an ancient statue and a mirror. 
Each of these actants influences the others. First of all there is 
the statue, treated not as a reflection of reality but rather as an 
ideal, a model that requires representation. One of the young men 
successfully imitates the ancient statue – in rather a complicated 
arrangement: He notices the correspondence in a mirror; also 
his friend does not see the reproduction of the statue’s stance 
in reality but only as a reflection. But this fleeting mirroring is 
gone immediately; it is easy to question but impossible to repeat.
Attempting to repeat it results in the loss of gracefulness. 
Completely different notions appear in its place. The young man’s 
body becomes imprisoned – although there is no question of any 
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physical imprisonment, the metaphors used suggest something 
heavy and restrictive: An invisible, incomprehensible power appears 
as an iron net. This set of metaphors is difficult to keep separate 
from economics – an iron cage, a structure hard as steel, and the 
invisible hand of the market that determines people’s economic 
actions. The young man in front of the mirror thus loses his 
charm and becomes entangled in the net of bourgeois life, a life 
without charm, a life tied to daily work and duties. In this case 
the easily accessible, private mirror turns out to be not so much 
a tool of the aesthetic narcissism of a romantic, beautiful soul 
as a mediator involving the individual in economic practice: The 
mirror, contrary to the ancient statue, is a commodity you have 
to pay for, and to pay for it you have to become implicated in 
a network of economic relations.
2. Mirror – mirroring of the world – 
art and science
The mirror model is one of the main tools of dialectic philos-
ophy (Holz, 2005; Schickel, 2012). Leibniz’s monadology treats 
an individual monad as a living reflection of the entirety of the 
world, and the relationship between what is mirrored and the 
mirroring itself opens up a whole complex of problems linked 
to the temporal and spatial aspect of representation. Contem-
porary philosophy in some of its realizations has moved from 
dialectic relationships to normative demands – then, mirroring 
stops being a dialectic relationship and becomes a cognitive and 
aesthetic norm. In such a case, science and art are given the task 
of correctly mirroring reality, for example anything in reality 
that is typical or progressive.
Note that in such a case, reification of the metaphor takes 
place – the reflection relationship is treated as virtually an auto-
matic mechanism, to the exclusion of the mirror, or even that 
mirror moment, understood as the place of a separate artefact, 
the spectacle’s mediator. In this theory, physical matter became 
primordial, while the social world was only supposed to be its 
reflection – this turned reflecting into a relationship of temporal 
succession and causality. Scientific learning about the social world 
and culture was meant to be limited to identifying relationships 
with physical entities. In aesthetics, too, the vision of the mirror 
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wandering across a courtyard to reflect all kinds of objects and 
phenomena can be reduced to the demand of simple realism, 
which is meant to be the criterion for evaluating individual works 
judged by their degree of progressiveness.
Where does this frequent reification of the metaphor come 
from? It occurs when the metaphor wears down, when you can 
no longer sense the moment of comparison, i.e. when the com-
plicated play of different compared objects is replaced with the 
illusion of the directness of a relationship, e.g. between language 
and reality. Meanwhile, living philosophy makes bold use of dif-
ferent objects that continue to have the metaphorical power of 
opening up to things that are new and unexpected, thus often 
drawing upon various technical and media-related innovations. 
This is the case, for instance, in the well-known passage from 
The German Ideology:
If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-
down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much 
from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on 
the retina does from their physical life-process2 (Marks, Engels 
1961, p. 27).
The definition of ideology here has nothing to do with sci-
entific exactitude, with serious defining of notions. Instead of 
logical operations, Marx builds a network of mediator objects: 
a camera obscura, which he must have known from experience 
but also from various diagrams explaining how it works, as well 
as the knowledge of optics and physiology of the time, also 
mediated through drawings of the eye. Therefore, this sentence is 
backed not only by a simple simile, but also by the institution of 
science from the first half of the 19th century, the latest media, 
and also the rules for copying the reality studied by science into 
textbooks and scientific works. It is something Bruno Latour 
2 English text from Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The German Ideology: 
Part One with selections from Parts Two and Three, together with Marx’s “Intro-
duction to a Critique of Political Economy”, edited and with introduction by 
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called procedures of inscription – inscribing reality into new 
means of representation. Dialectic mirroring of reality, therefore, 
cannot be considered as an abstract process but has to take into 
account a network of different artefacts, mediators taking part 
in creating the representation.
The mirror also became the main metaphor in speculative 
philosophy, enabling us to speak of indirectness (Kuhn, 2014, 
p. 385). The structure of a mirror reflection involves a number 
of moments and differences that enable the content of speculative 
thinking to be expressed. This speculative status already belongs 
to the dual meaning of the mirror – on one hand being a physical 
object built from a specific material, while on the other being 
able to be a mirror only when it reflects something else – which 
makes it an object that actually cannot be seen, because other 
objects are always visible in it, reflected in the mirror surface. 
Being a mirror, therefore, is inseparably linked to the fact that 
we always see in it something other than the mirror itself. This 
structure has enormous speculative potential, because it enables 
us to think about objects that are visible things but at the same 
time are not so much the object that we are looking at, but rather 
they enable us to see something else, and, continuing – they 
make possible the existence of a reflection as well as enabling 
thinking about the difference between the thing reflected and 
the reflection. This means there is speculative potential in the 
duplication of objects itself, and in the problem of things that 
are visible and invisible at the same time, catching our eye in 
order to allow us to see something else.
3. Practical refl ection
Both in the philosophy of the subject and in metaphysics and 
art, the mirror metaphor proceeded toward stability and immo-
bilization. The mirror the subject faced, just like the reflection 
of the entirety of the world, was supposed to offer the possibility 
of aesthetic and theoretical cognition. The practical use of mir-
rors remained in the background. Meanwhile, mirrors do not so 
much serve the purpose of looking at ourselves or contemplat-
ing mirrored images as they expand our momentary perceptual 
capacity, enabling us to see what is “at the back of our head.” In 
this context, Umberto Eco speaks of mirrors as being prosthet-
ics, instruments expanding the scope of operation of a specific 
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organ, in this case the eyes (Eco, 2012, p.  18), allowing us to 
look behind us without turning our head.
Eco analyzes the example of an arrangement of mirrors thanks 
to which you can see what is going on behind you – there are 
movie examples of seeing someone entering a room and being 
noticed by another person. Probably the most interesting case, 
though, could be the use of mirrors in cars: Mirrors assist those 
traveling by car, where such travel in itself expands human capac-
ity. Glancing in the mirrors is a routine action enabling the driver 
to gain information about other road users. Therefore, it is an 
important channel of communication with the surroundings. In 
this case the reflected image does not serve any aesthetic or theo-
retical contemplation, but is combined with the movement of body 
and vehicle. Mirroring serves to provide information important 
only at a given moment, connected with the current situation.
In theoretical deliberations on reflections, one crucial category 
was isomorphism as well as the structural correspondence between 
the thing represented and the representation. This shared form, 
however, assumed the hylomorphism of traditional metaphysics. 
But the mirror requires a different metaphysics – interesting inspi-
ration in this respect is provided by Tim Ingold’s project and his 
theory of medium, substances and surfaces. Above all, mirrors 
are special surfaces in which other surfaces are reflected – this 
applies to the water mirror as well as artefacts. It appears that 
mirrors create images without matter, but it may be more apt to 
state that these are images of surfaces without substance. It is 
hard to say that mirrors have the capacity to capture form and 
create some kind of isomorphism, especially in a metaphysical 
sense. It would be much more intuitive to speak of mirroring 
the surface of things. But what is this surface? In Ingold’s con-
cept (2018) the surface is the boundary between substance and 
medium – meaning that what is duplicated is a thing’s surface 
boundary and not its internal structure. A relationship between 
different surfaces is formed – they are reflected in one another, 
creating a network of duplicates and appearances of spatial depth, 
flickering images multiplying the observed world.
Conclusion
Mirroring has functioned as the most important character-
ization of truth – both the truth of science and the truth of art. 
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The metaphor of mirroring, however, quickly got entangled in 
linguistic representation – it was words and sentences, notions 
and judgments that were meant to reflect reality. The dialectic 
of mirroring has gone in the same direction, treating the mirror 
as a principle of philosophical speculation. But the mirror can 
be treated completely differently – more physically and more 
network-based; then, it gains its own history – and it is precisely 
this history that always has to be somewhere in the background 
of the metaphor’s interpretation. But the mirror, or actually the 
multiplicity of different mirrors and, more broadly, mechanisms 
by which reality is reflected in artefacts, is an important element 
of creating and representing reality. Mirrors become historical 
mediators that take part in a complicated network made up of 
people and things.
The dependence of theoretical thinking on metaphors, a popu-
lar notion in the second half of the 20th century, only partly 
fulfills the task of network-based thinking about mirroring. 
The proposals of Hans Blumenberg and Jacques Derrida (2002) 
emphasized the permanent presence of metaphors in philosophi-
cal texts, especially wherever the meaning of the most impor-
tant categories needed to be explained. The concept of absolute 
metaphors assumed there is a limited set of images that mediate 
in understanding ideas such as the world, the soul, or history. 
I would not want to question the achievements of these philoso-
phers, but it seems to me that their analyses stopped at too early 
a stage. Metaphors in the analyses of Blumenberg and Derrida 
are caged in the realm of text; they are words rather than things. 
Meanwhile, many of the absolute metaphors have very concrete 
equivalents in the world of life, and their meaning is not exhausted 
in schematic images. Most of these objects have their history, they 
undergo different changes – one such example being the mirror, 
changing its symbolic meaning but also its material structure.
Thus, the mirror sits at the intersection of different discourses. 
The mirror is a node in a complicated network – a node com-
bining theory and practice, science and aesthetics, technology 
and speculation. Thanks to this capacity for uniting seemingly 
distant realms, an analysis of the mirror could be a paradigm 
for network and complex analysis in which the inhomogeneous 
components of the world find a voice.
This attempt at outlining different meanings of the mir-
ror also shows how complicated the discussion must be about 
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abstract categories that we try to express with the help of the 
image of the mirror. The issue of truth and falsehood is one of 
those issues that can appear to be simple, clear and obvious, but 
in fact require the engagement of all kinds of actants: human 
and non-human, and also the presentation of the processes in 
which, thanks to the involvement of different phenomena and 
technologies, all that is human is shaped.
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